"The house of your church is burning":Race and responsibility in Marilynne Robinson’s <i>Gilead</i> by Spinks, Lee
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
'The house of your church is burning’
Citation for published version:
Spinks, L 2017, ''The house of your church is burning’: Race and responsibility in Marilynne Robinson’s
'Gilead' ' Journal of American Studies. DOI: 10.1017/S0021875816000633
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.1017/S0021875816000633
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Peer reviewed version
Published In:
Journal of American Studies
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 05. Apr. 2019
1 
 
 
“The House of Your Church is Burning’”: Race and Responsibility in Marilynne 
Robinson’s Gilead.” 
 
“There is no group in history I admire more than the abolitionists, but from their example I 
conclude that there are two questions we must always ask ourselves – what do we choose 
not to know, and what do we fail to anticipate?”1 
“And why do I worry so much over this Jack Boughton?”2 
 
There is a revealing moment in his unfinished Ethics when Dietrich Bonhoeffer, the German 
Lutheran pastor and theologian executed in April 1945 for his role in the covert resistance to 
Hitler, reflects upon the figure of the slave.  It comes during his discussion of the 
preparation of the way of grace required by all who participate in the justifying faith.  
Bonhoeffer begins this discussion by pointing out that the doctrine of justification presumes 
that the person has incurred guilt and stands in need of salvation; only she can be justified 
who has already been the subject of a prior accusation.3  God’s grace is therefore always 
preceded by some penultimate thing, some action, suffering, or hope, at the end of which it 
stands.  The penultimate realm of mortal existence, rightly considered, is not a state or 
condition sufficient to itself but the preparation of the way by which grace becomes possible 
for man.  Because God is present and active in the whole of the world, the preparation of the 
way of grace necessarily involves us in a responsibility towards all those others who share in 
the divine creation; from the standpoint of redemption responsibility for oneself therefore 
                                                          
1   Marilynne Robinson,  The Death of Adam: Essays on Modern Thought (1998; London: Picador, 2005), 
251.  All further references to this edition are marked DA and incorporated into main text.  
2   Marilynne Robinson  Gilead (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2004). 209.   All further 
references to this edition are marked G and incorporated into main text.  
3   Dietrich Bonhoeffer.  Ethics trans Neville Horton-Smith ed. Eberhard Bethge (London: SCM Press, 
1955), 83. 
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always also means responsibility with respect to mankind.4  No doxa or freestanding code, 
Bonhoeffer insists, can decide the exact nature of the spiritual responsibility enjoined upon 
us in any given situation; instead a responsible Christian ethics requires a free decision by 
which we each try to establish the will of God in terms of our unconditional obligation to the 
others in our midst.  It is the particular responsibility of the preacher (or “proclaimer of the 
word”) to help ensure the conditions of life through which goodness and grace may be 
achieved; this responsibility meets its ultimate test in its response to a situation like slavery 
which excludes the possibility of free decision upon which the way of grace depends: 
“Now from this there follows something which is of crucial importance.  For the 
sake of the ultimate the penultimate must be preserved.  Any arbitrary 
destruction of the penultimate will do serious damage to the ultimate.  If, for 
example, a human life is deprived of the conditions which are proper to it, then 
the justification of a life by grace and faith, if it is not rendered impossible, is at 
least seriously impeded.  In concrete terms, if a slave is so far prevented from 
making free use of his time that he can no longer hear the preaching of the word, 
then this word of God cannot in any case lead him to the justifying faith.  From 
this fact it follows that it is necessary to see to it that the penultimate, too, is 
provided with the ultimate word of God, the proclamation of the justification of 
the sinner by grace alone, lest the destruction of the penultimate should prove a 
hindrance to the ultimate.  If the proclaimer of the word does not at the same 
time take every measure to ensure that the word may be heard, then he is not 
                                                          
4   Ibid., 194. 
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satisfying the claim of the word to pass free and unhindered.  The way must be 
made ready for the word.  It is the word itself that demands it.”5 
Bonhoeffer’s belief that the spiritual promise of grace and redemption was threatened 
whenever a human life is deprived of the conditions which are proper to it informed his 
decision to join the religious resistance to Nazi racial tyranny.  The story of Bonhoeffer’s 
intensifying commitment to the anti-fascist resistance, from its beginning in his refusal to 
abide by the provisions of the so-called Aryan Clause of 1933 prohibiting Jewish Christians 
from serving as ministers in Protestant churches, to his participation in the Confessing 
Church from the mid-1930s and his climactic role as an agent for the Abwehr, the German 
military intelligence organisation which became the nucleus for the Officer’s Plot and the 
various assassination attempts upon Hitler, is also the story of his gradual acceptance of the 
necessity of direct political opposition to the murderous forces of ethnic particularism and 
religious persecution.  Downcast by the German Churches’ accommodation of the new Nazi 
regime, he initially decided in late 1933 to leave Germany and accept a Pastorship in 
England.6  Although Bonhoeffer’s move to England may well have been motivated by a 
desire to attract international support for the religious resistance at home, his decision to 
quit Germany drew a stinging rebuke from Karl Barth who accused him of abandoning his 
homeland “while the house of your church is burning” and instructed him to return to 
Berlin “by the next ship.”7  Bonhoeffer’s subsequent return to Germany to head one of the 
soon-to-be-outlawed seminaries established by the Confessing Church marked him from the 
                                                          
5  Ibid., 92-93. 
6  As Robinson observes, Bonhoeffer’s decision to leave Germany may be partly explained by internal 
church opposition to the Bethel Confession, which he wrote with Martin Niemöller, and which 
declared, “It is the task of Christians who come from the Gentile world to expose themselves to 
persecution rather than to surrender, willingly or unwillingly, even in one single respect, their 
kinship with Jewish Christians in the Church, founded on Word and Sacrament.”  The Death of Adam 
114-115. 
7   Dietrich Bonhoeffer,  No Rusty Swords: Letters, Lectures and Notes, 1928-1936, Collected Works of 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Volume 1 (London: Collins, 1977) 235. 
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outset as a political heretic whose steadfast refusal to accept the racial doctrine promulgated 
by the Nazi state and deepening involvement in the underground resistance led inexorably 
to his arrest in April 1943 and his murder two years later in Flossenbürg Concentration 
Camp. 
Bonhoeffer’s life and teaching has been a continuing presence in the work of the 
contemporary American novelist Marilynne Robinson.  The enduring richness and challenge 
of Bonhoeffer’s thought, Robinson observes in an essay on his theology, lies in its absolute 
commitment to the universal dispensation of grace and the ethical structure of responsible 
life.  Beyond all else, Robinson points out, Bonhoeffer’s theology is a statement of faith in the 
infinite reach of God’s grace and compassion which embraces the whole of life without 
distinction.  Within this faith man is appointed to the sphere of concrete responsibility which 
knows the world as being created, loved, condemned and reconciled by God and which acts 
in the world in accordance with this knowledge.  The Christian principle is only established 
for Bonhoeffer in the concrete responsibility of action which springs from the reconciliation 
of man with man portended by Jesus Christ.8  To prepare the way for Christ therefore means 
to accept responsibility for what he calls the “unity of life” without exception or remainder.9  
The inviolable foundation of Bonhoeffer’s Christian ethics, Robinson reminds us, is that 
“Christ wills that the weak and persecuted should be rescued, and he must be obeyed; that 
Christ is present in the weak and persecuted, and he must be honored.”10  His practical 
fidelity to this ethical obligation would cost him his life.  But the ethical commitment of 
Christian responsibility cannot be evaded: the responsible man is precisely he who assumes 
responsibility for his neighbour in his concrete possibility.11  As the story of Bonhoeffer’s 
                                                          
8  Bonhoeffer, Dietrich Ethics 202. 
9  Ibid, 190. 
10  Robinson, Marilynne.  The Death of Adam 110. 
11   Bonhoeffer, Dietrich. Ethics 204. 
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heroic resistance and final martyrdom tragically attests, this ethics of neighbourly 
responsibility carries with it an unswerving commitment to what he called costly or active 
grace which, taking up its position against the world in the world, seeks to preserve our 
unconditional obligation to the persecuted other person in our midst: 
“Through all this, Bonhoeffer wrote theology – sermons, lectures, circular letters, 
and books.  In a very great degree his writing is characterised by beautiful 
iterations of doctrine, a sort of visionary orthodoxy.  “History lives between 
promise and fulfilment.  It carries the promise within itself, to become full of 
God, the womb of the birth of God.” To understand his method one must 
remember his circumstances.  He is asserting the claims of Christ in all their 
radicalism in order to encourage and reassure those drawn to what became the 
Confessing Church.  At the same time, he is chastising those who use 
Christianity as an escape from the evils of the world and from the duties those 
evils imply, and he is chastising those who have accommodated their religion to 
the prevailing culture so thoroughly as to make the prevailing culture their 
religion.  His object is to make core beliefs immediate and compelling, to forbid 
the evasions of transcendence and of acculturation.  He is using the scandal of 
the cross to discover the remnant church among the multitudes of the religion.”12 
In the remarks that follow I want to consider how Robinson’s engagement with Bonhoeffer 
might open up readings of her acclaimed second novel Gilead (2004) which restore a proper 
sense of the troubled racial history at its core.13  Although this troubled history recurs 
throughout the novel in a number of different guises, my discussion will focus in particular 
                                                          
12   Robinson, Marilynne.  The Death of Adam 115-116. 
13  Upon its publication Gilead was awarded both the 2005 National Book Award and the Pulitzer 
Prize for Fiction. 
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upon the process of unconcealment, localised partly in the gradual awakening of the 
repressed but still smouldering memory of the historic burning of Gilead’s black church,  by 
which the novel’s narrator-protagonist is eventually compelled to confront the enduring 
legacy of Bleeding Kansas, the question of the proper ethical response to the racial tyranny 
of the Slave Power, and the contemporary reality of the racial crisis disfiguring 1950s 
America in the years immediately preceding the great struggle for Civil Rights.  My reading 
therefore proceeds at a certain distance from two influential sets of responses to Gilead which 
either repress any substantive trace of this history from their critical field of vision or invite 
us to discover the cause of such repression in Robinson’s own refusal to come to terms with 
the wider historical dimension of the events her novel describes.14  To come closer to a sense 
both of the principal points at issue in this critical contention and my reason for seeking to 
develop a reading of Robinson’s novel upon very different terms it may be helpful to recall 
some basic details of Gilead’s plot and historical contexture.  Thus Gilead is set in 1956 in the 
small rural homestead of Gilead, Iowa, where the Congregationalist minister John Ames, 
now seventy-six years old and with a failing heart, begins a letter to his infant son in the 
hope of offering him posthumous fatherly counsel concerning the right way “to live a good 
life” (G: 3).  Ames’s letter, the letter that becomes the novel, has two principal points of 
                                                          
14  An example of this second style of reading appears in Christopher Douglas’s “Christian 
Multiculturalism and Unlearned History in Gilead.”  Throughout his article Douglas rebukes 
Robinson for eliding the “historical Christian support for slavery,” dwelling at considerable length on 
the perceived contradiction between this act of historical occlusion and her repeated stress in her non-
fiction upon the importance of “trying to get ‘the past’ right.”  Douglas’s trenchant conclusion is that 
the “reason for Gilead’s evasion of history - its will to not learn historical lessons—is that Robinson 
conceives of history as the source of what we have come to call “identity” in contemporary American 
multiculturalism,” a process of identity-formation which, in treating history as a kind of memory, 
permits “the formation of a liberal white Christian identity that ‘forgets’ about the complexity of 
actual Christian history.”  The crucial weakness of this reading of the novel, however, is its 
dependence upon a structural confusion between author and protagonist.  Thus while it is certainly 
true that Ames treats history as a kind of memory which enables him to repress the ethical demand 
central to his grandfather’s radical abolitionism, his encounters with Jack Boughton are expressly 
designed by Robinson to enact a type of “rememory” of the past which compels him to confront the 
continuing trauma of African-American disenfranchisement from Bleeding Kansas to the emerging 
Civil Rights movement of his own time.  See Douglas, “Christian Multiculturalism,” 337, 338, 343. 
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narrative focus: an elliptical and often agonised reflection upon his own recent family 
history and a plangent meditation upon some of the key tenets of his abiding Calvinist faith.  
Ames’s rehearsal of his family story centres upon the unresolved schism between his father 
and paternal grandfather over the proper Christian response to slavery in the years 
immediately preceding the Civil War: Ames’s grandfather, a friend and ally of Jim Lane and 
John Brown, supported Brown’s armed intervention into the Kansas War of the mid-1850s 
before fighting and losing an eye in the Union cause during the ensuing Civil War; his 
support for violent abolitionism was bitterly condemned by Ames’s father, like himself a 
Congregationalist Minister, whose opposition to slavery was rooted in the principles of 
Christian pacifism. 
Throughout the novel Robinson supplements Ames’s habit of historical reminiscence with a 
second style of narrative expounding elements of his spiritual autobiography in which he 
meditates upon questions of spiritual good and ethical duty, sin and forgiveness, right 
perception and responsible action, the preparation of the way of grace and the trace of the 
redeemed world concealed in all earthy things.  Robinson’s remarkable ability to harmonise 
the Christian vision of grace with classical ethical notions of the good or well-lived life, is 
partly responsible, to my mind at least, for the extraordinary acclaim which accompanied 
the novel’s appearance on behalf of a reading public responsive to modes of perception 
which might refine and expand our sense of human experience beyond a prevailing ethic of 
competitive self-seeking and the subordination of social values to the values of the 
marketplace.  What is too often missed, however, by those readings of Ames’s narrative 
beguiled by its insistence that the sacred fount of our common humanity can be inferred 
from the world in the experience of goodness, forgiveness and love is that this visionary 
embrace of the idea of universal spiritual community conceals a significant failure of ethical 
imagination linked in turn to an unresolved historical question of justice and responsibility.  
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Crucially, this ethical failure occurs in relation to an act of racial exclusion – the incineration 
of Gilead’s solitary black church and the subsequent dispersal of its congregation - which 
reawakens unhappy memories of Bleeding Kansas and the slavery wars of the 1850s that led 
to the original inception of Gilead as a defensive redoubt for radical abolitionist forces.  
Behind these troubled memories lies the unquiet figure of John Brown, whose 
uncompromising demand that the universal basis of Christian ethics begins in our absolute 
responsibility to an absolutely singular other compels us to consider how far Ames’s life and 
example does justice to his own belief in the unconditional spiritual principle that “we exist 
in being without remainder” (G: 178).  A century later Ames confronts the enduring force of 
this legacy in his encounters with his godson Jack Boughton, a figure who shares John 
Brown’s initials and who returns to Gilead to pose a series of searching questions concerning 
the town’s forsaking of its radical abolitionist inheritance and Ames’s own seeming 
indifference to the still unfulfilled promise of racial equality a hundred years after John 
Brown’s passion at Harpers Ferry.15 
                                                          
15 To speak in this way of Brown’s “legacy” is to suggest that no sincere attempt to grasp the ethical 
complexity of abolitionist involvement in the antislavery struggle in 1850s Kansas, least of all one 
informed like Ames’s own by the Christian principle that we participate in spiritual being without 
difference or distinction, can properly evade the need to come to some kind of reckoning with 
Brown’s insistence upon the universal dimension of moral responsibility, the necessary connection 
between our unconditional obligation to the victims of social persecution and the requirement of 
practical action, and his demand for a new republican dispensation cleansed of racial discrimination 
and oppression.  To say this is neither to seek to exculpate Brown from the atrocities associated with 
the name of “Pottawatomie John Brown” nor to succumb to the “lure of transcendence” by following 
him in deriving justification for political violence in an antinomian conception of moral authority 
(Taylor, 96).  It is, however, to recall to memory that the catalyst for Brown’s martial insurgency into 
Kansas was to revive the encompassing vision of a universal brotherhood of man proclaimed in the 
New Testament and denied by those unwilling to resist the murderous abrogation of this universal 
principle by “proslavery terrorists” during the Kansas war (DeCaro Jr, 12).  Against the unsparing 
historical backdrop of 1850s Kansas, in which what passed for political legitimacy was the unstable 
and highly contingent effect of an internal economy of violence and where institutional support for 
the proslavery campaign of terror against abolitionist groupings extended to the Presidency itself, 
pacifistic and pietistic appeals to an ethics of nonviolence necessarily ran the risk of structural 
complicity with forces implacably opposed to that opening to the other which constitutes the basis of 
every ethical relation.  In circumstances like these, I want to suggest, part of the violence done to 
ethical reflection by the memory of John Brown is to remind us of the agonistic location of the ethics 
of abolitionist history between two kinds of violence on the uncertain border between justice and law 
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My sense of the importance of this radical abolitionist history to a reading of Ames’s 
narrative has been little shared by other commentators upon the novel who have chosen to 
focus their attention in quite different directions. Variously entranced by Ames’s 
unwavering commitment to self-knowledge and right perception in the face of his own 
impending death and his rapturous celebration of the transcendent beauty of a natural 
world which incarnates the miracle of divine creation, much of Robinson’s audience has 
elected to read his letter either as a type of sublime secular ethics or a materialised spiritual 
vision rather than a fraught mediation upon the burden of an historical inheritance.  
Certainly to the eyes of many reviewers Gilead is not merely a great contemporary novel but 
a great novel about goodness which through the grace and scrupulosity of Ames’s work and 
teaching presents an abiding image of what it might be to live a good and responsible life.16  
For some, like Jeffrey Hart, the ethical and aesthetic potency of Ames’s style of writing lies in 
its singular capacity to detach thought and perception from the unreflective flow of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
which defines the unstable ground of every genuinely ethical decision.  See Andrew Taylor,.  
“Consenting to Violence: Henry David Thoreau, John Brown and the Transcendent Intellectual,” The 
Afterlife of John Brown eds Andrew Taylor and Eldrid Herrington (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2005); Louis 
A Decaro Jr,.  “Black People’s Ally, White People’s Bogeyman: A John Brown Story,” The Afterlife of 
John Brown.   
16  Many examples of this prevailing critical view which identifies the novel’s extraordinary aesthetic 
reverberation with the scope and consolatory power of Ames’s own ethical vision might be cited.  For 
James Wood “Gilead is a beautiful work – demanding, grave and lucid . . . . Robinson’s words have a 
spiritual force that’s very rare in contemporary fiction.”  In Neel Mukherjee’s judgement, Gilead is “a 
book of such meditative calm, such spiritual intensity that it seems miraculous that [Robinson’s] 
silence was only for twenty-three years; such measure of wisdom is the fruit of a lifetime.  Robinson’s 
prose, aligned with the sublime simplicity of the language of the bible, is nothing short of a 
benediction.  You might not share its faith, but it is difficult not to be awed, moved, and ultimately 
humbled by the spiritual effulgence that lights up the novel from within.”  Echoing Mukherjee’s 
conclusion, Stevie Davies observes that “The slow pulse of Robinson’s writing slows the reader’s eye 
and mind, and creates in the reading process a literary version of the narrator’s spiritual experience.  
Gilead reminds us that words have power to spare, to forgive, to do justice.”  Donald Morrison, 
meanwhile, underscores the ethical foundation of this vision with exemplary concision: “Ames is that 
rarity in fiction, a thoroughly good man.”  See James Wood,  “Acts of Devotion,” New York Times.  
November 28, 2004: 11-12; Neel Muckherjee, “Gilead,” The Times.  April 16, 2005: 16; Stevie Davies,  
“A Revival of Faith in Fiction,” The Independent.  March 25, 2005: 22; Donald Morrison,  “Acts of 
Devotion,” Financial Times. March 25, 2005: 26. 
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everyday speech and opinion, and, in so doing, recall us to our own responsibility for the 
use we make of the world.  In contemplating life from the side of the grave, Hart observes, 
Ames “achieves a concentration of mind that enables him to see, hear, reflect, his senses so 
alive to profound experience. . . . As existence becomes conscious of itself it reaches its own 
edges, sees the world with greater clarity, and wonders about its is-ness.”17 
Sedulously relocating the ethical and aesthetic dimension of Ames’s narrative within the 
broader theological dimension of Robinson’s work, Christopher Liese meanwhile argues 
that Gilead’s real imaginative drama lies in its enactment of a Calvinist testament of faith 
which, refusing the stereotypical and forbidding association of Calvinism with aesthetic 
impoverishment and intolerant asceticism, derives much of its power of spiritual revelation 
from its scrupulous attentiveness to the beauty of the mundane world that sees such natural 
resplendence “not simply as an a fortiori argument for the beauty of God’s afterlife, but as an 
experience of the divine itself.”18  Incarnate within the stream of epiphanies which suffuses 
Ames’s narrative, Liese suggests, is “an experience of the divine in the immediate and the 
immanent” that offers a visionary encapsulation of Robinson’s Calvinist faith that God is 
present and active in the whole of the world; in their beautiful iteration of the belief that the 
immanence of God can be inferred from the world in the experience of goodness, beauty 
and love, he concludes, these “irruptions of aesthetic appreciation”  become “somehow 
more essential to the novel’s overall meaning than the plotted sequence of events” 
containing Ames’s extended family history.19   
                                                          
17  Jeffrey Hart,  “Now, a Masterpiece,”   National Review  April 11, 2005.  46-47. 
18  Christopher Liese,  “That Little Incandescence’: Reading the Fragmentary and John Calvin in 
Marilynne Robinson’s Gilead.” Studies in the Novel  Volume 41 No 3 (Fall 2009), 351. 
19   Ibid., 349.  Similarly  highlighting Gilead’s preoccupation with the phenomenology of perception 
rather than the reverberations set in train by the problem of choosing the right conduct of life in 
response to more general social forces of violence and exclusion, Laura E. Tanner  mobilises current 
scientific understandings of the neurobiology of consciousness to suggest that what she calls “the 
cultural force of Robinson’s text” stems “not only from its lyrical rendering of quotidian experience 
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Those readings that discover the “overall meaning” of Gilead in its imaginative fidelity to the 
ethical or numinous texture of Ames’s own narrative style routinely look for support to 
passages like the one below where the cultivation of our receptivity to natural beauty 
promises to restore our sense of the achieved miracle of creation: 
“I am thinking about the word “just.”  I almost wish that I could have written 
that the sun just shone and the tree just glistened, and the water just poured out of 
it and the girl just laughed – when it’s used that way it does indicate a stress on 
the word that follows it, and also a particular pitch of the voice.  People talk that 
way when they want to call attention to a thing existing in excess of itself, so to 
speak, a sort of purity or lavishness, at any rate something ordinary in kind but 
exceptional in degree . . . There is something real signified by that word “just” 
that proper language won’t acknowledge.” (G: 28) 
What holds my attention in this passage, however, is the way in which Ames’s 
particularised and embodied awareness of the singular power of perception is 
simultaneously ghosted by the trace of some excess or exorbitance which suggests to 
him that the meaning of our experience, like our language, isn’t simply interior to itself 
but exists in its openness to an outside or “other” that precedes and exceeds our 
relation to ourselves.  While this momentary insight into the exorbitant or 
transcendental structure of experience appears on one level wholly consistent with the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
but from its powerful unveiling of how dying shapes the sensory and psychological dynamics of 
human perception.  Gilead localizes Ames’s psychic struggle with his own death in acts of perpetual 
processing which it both depicts and thematizes; the novel pushes existential concerns back into the 
realm of lived experience to explore the way that Ames’s experience of dying traps him in the 
collapsing space between perception and representation”19  By so forcefully locating the imaginative 
apprehension of death at the centre of perception, Tanner concludes, the novel presents a powerful 
experience of the “embodied psychological dynamics of aging” while offering “one point of entry to 
broader cultural dialogues about these issues.”  Laura E. Tanner, “Looking Back from the Grave: 
Sensory Perception and the Anticipation of Absence in Marilynne Robinson’s Gilead,” Contemporary 
Literature  Volume 48. No 2 (Summer 2007),  228, 251. 
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framework of his Congregationalist faith, it also, I want to argue, exposes a fault-line 
in his Christian ethics which gradually unsettles the foundations of his entire narrative 
account.  This fault-line manifests itself in a certain incommensurability between the 
particular and the universal which as Jacques Derrida has shown is intrinsic to the 
very conception of ethically responsible judgement. 
The paradox of responsibility for Derrida is that it is always and at the same time born 
both from responsibility to a singular other (a neighbour, a lover, God) and to all those 
other others which constitute the idea of responsibility in general.  “Duty or 
responsibility,” Derrida reminds us, “binds me to the other, to the other as other, and 
ties me in my absolute singularity to the other as other.  God is the name of the 
absolute other as other and as unique.”20  Yet as soon as I embrace that notion of 
responsibility which binds me in my singularity to the absolute singularity of the 
other, I am immediately propelled into the space or risk of absolute sacrifice because “I 
cannot respond to the call, the request, the obligation, or even the love of another 
without sacrificing the other other, the other others.”21  The scandal and the paradox of 
responsibility consists precisely in the fact that in the moment I enter into a 
relationship with the other I can respond only by sacrificing ethics either by binding 
myself to the other to the exclusion of all the other others or, in seeking to align my 
“ethical” response with the universal concept of duty, failing to respond to the other in 
the face of the singular demand he makes upon me.  To be responsible, Derrida 
concludes, I must fail either in my responsibility to the other in his absolute singularity 
or to all the others, to the “ethical and political generality,” and the sacrifice 
                                                          
20  Jacques Derrida,  The Gift of Death trans David Wills (Chicago: University of Chicago Press) 68 
21  Ibid., 68. 
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necessarily required by this decision can never be justified.22  Against this background 
true responsibility demands that I act in the memory and the name of the sacrifice I 
make in choosing between this one and that one, between this path and its alternative, 
and, in so doing, continue to endure the trial of the unjustifiable decision that 
paradoxically constitutes the ground of any ethical, theological, or political order of 
responsibility.  
Derrida’s insight into the paradox between absolute responsibility (responsibility to the 
singular other in our midst) and responsibility in general (or ethics) offers a provoking 
insight both into Ames’s deeply ambivalent response to the contention over slavery which 
tore his family apart and his continuing guilt at taking his father’s side of the story.  The 
shadow cast upon Ames’s thinking by the paradoxical structure of responsibility may be 
glimpsed in a pivotal passage where he reflects upon one of the central issues at stake in his 
Christian ethics: 
“There is an important thing, which I have told many people, and which my 
father told me, and which his father told him.  When you encounter another 
person, when you have dealings with anyone at all, it is as if a question is being 
put to you.  So you must think, What is the Lord asking of me in this moment, in 
this situation?  If you consult insult or antagonism, your first impulse will be to 
respond in kind.  But if you think, as it were, This is an emissary from the Lord, 
and some benefit is intended for me, first of all the occasion to demonstrate my 
faithfulness, the chance to show that I do in some small degree participate in the 
grace that saved me, you are free to act otherwise as circumstances would seem 
to  dictate.  You are free to act by your own lights.  You are freed at the same 
                                                          
22  Ibid., 70. 
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time of the impulse to hate or resent that person.  He would probably laugh at 
the thought that the Lord sent him to you for your benefit (and his), but that is 
the perfection of his disguise, his own ignorance of it.” (G: 124) 
Several aspects of this passage repay attention.  It is instructive, to begin with, to note the 
rhetorical similarity between Ames’s phrasing here and Bonhoeffer’s earlier remarks 
regarding the indispensability of free decision to ethical responsibility and the coming of 
grace (“This is an important thing, which I have told many people”); throughout Gilead 
Robinson artfully interweaves Bonhoeffer’s credal language with Ames’s own in ways 
which redirect our attention to the former’s crucial distinction between “cheap grace” or 
“religiosity” that “uses Christianity as an escape from the evils of the world and from the 
duties those evils imply” and the “costly grace” of actively embracing our Christian duty to 
oppose persecution and injustice wherever it appears.23  Secondly, the lesson Ames yearns to 
impart to his son was passed down to him via his father from his grandfather; these words 
carry a history, that is, inseparable from the ethical demand they make upon us.  And, third, 
the structure of ethical response as it is given here resolves nothing but rather suspends us 
between an unconditional obligation to the absolutely other (“When you encounter another 
person”) and the obligation to all the other others (“when you have dealings with anyone at 
all”) which upholds our responsibility to any ethical or spiritual generality.  In such a 
situation, as Derrida reminds us, the two equal and conflicting demands placed upon us by 
our responsibility to the other in our midst produce “a paradox and aporia not resolved by a 
simple choice or decision between the two, but rather an aporia that exposes the 
undecideability within, and inherent violence of, every choice or decision.”24  Ethical 
responsibility, we might say, is born in a moment of decision which reveals the irreducible 
                                                          
23    Marilynne Robinson,  The Death of Adam 115. 
24  Nicola Anderson, Derrida: Ethics under Erasure (London: Continuum, 2012) 90. 
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violence of every ethical decision.  No formal precepts or system of rules can determine the 
content of this choice about the right conduct of life; it follows that any Christian ethics 
worthy of the name must always involve a certain antinomianism (“You are free to act by 
your own lights”) by which we become absolutely responsible for how and to whom we 
respond in the abyssal space of (ir)responsible decision. 
Because Ames’s meditation upon his grandfather’s parable immediately follows a period of 
perturbation during which he acknowledges that his “only role is to be gracious” in his 
dealings with his recalcitrant godson Jack Boughton, it is tempting to read it as the 
culminating expression of that Christian ethics based upon boundless compassion, the 
heroic act of forgiveness and humane devotion to justice in the world which Robinson 
celebrates in Bonhoeffer’s gospel.25  But implicit in this Christian parable, as we have seen, is 
the trace of a very different vision of responsible action which reveals the potential violence 
of every ethical decision.  The question posed to us in the encounter with another person, to 
put this differently, does not ask us to choose between responsibility and irresponsibility but 
implicates us rather in the insoluble and paradoxical contradiction between absolute 
responsibility and responsibility in general.  Caught up in this paradoxical contradiction, we 
have to decide, and in deciding we always risk doing violence to the other that is not this 
other, or to every other other, or to this other in the name of every other.  There is, for this 
reason, no non-violent ethics or responsibility; in our dealings with others we are instead 
always already implicated in an economy of violence, and an irreducible element of any 
ethics is to acknowledge the necessary violence of our own acts of responsible decision. 
What makes Ames’s rehearsal of this parable so unsettling to the story he wishes to tell is 
that it inevitably returns us to the unresolved question his letter periodically opens only 
                                                          
25   Marilynne Robinson,  The Death of Adam 111. 
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immediately to close down: the ethical stakes of the dispute between his father and 
grandfather which finally tore his family apart.  For Ames’s grandfather, following John 
Brown, the outcast figure of the slave enjoins upon us the ethical imperative to respond to 
the call of the other in its absolute singularity before and beyond our responsibility to ethical 
generality (or law), especially when that generality presents itself in political and 
institutional form as an instrument of dispossession and destitution.  In doing violence to 
law, such ethics violates its obligation to a general and universal responsibility in the belief 
that in acting irresponsibly it is being responsible to God.  Ames’s father, meanwhile, 
condemns abolitionist violence by appealing to the principles of Christian pacifism which, in 
their dutiful observance of the biblical injunction against killing and legal prohibitions upon 
armed resistance, necessarily risk failing in its absolute and irreducible responsibility to the 
singular other (the slave).  The situation of the slave is utterly precarious, and a decision 
must be made, and yet either response can only come into force by means of an irresponsible 
leap of faith that brings its own ethics into question.  In preferring his father’s example Ames 
establishes his allegiance to Christian ethics by betraying the singular responsibility he 
professes to uphold; he is therefore at once the most ethical and unethical of men, compelled 
by the necessity of decision into uneasy and guilty fidelity to a version of responsible action 
with which he cannot keep absolute faith.  Suspended between two equal, because 
absolutely imperative, demands and marooned against his will in the aporetic space of the 
(ir)responsible decision, the ethics of Ames’s narrative is consequently not to be found in a 
lexicon concerning responsibility circling the question of the good life but rather in a type of 
abyssal equivocity and a form of unknowing knowing which continually undermines the 
terms of his own accounting by reinscribing the force of the radical and uncompromising 
commitment to the absolute other which goes by the names of the grandfather, John Brown, 
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and Jack Boughton, whose return to Gilead make Ames bear reluctant witness to the 
paradoxical but necessary knowledge that “There is never just one transgression” (G: 122). 
The amplifying effects of Ames’s unhappy suspicion that in identifying with his father’s 
spiritual example he has sacrificed something essential to a responsible ethics reveal 
themselves in a number of ways.  Their presence can be felt in Ames’s very first description 
of his relation to his father: 
“I believe I’ll make an experiment with candor here . . . . My father was a man 
who acted from principle, as he said himself.  He acted from faithfulness to the 
truth as he saw it.  But something in the way he went about it made him 
disappointing from time to time, and not just to me. . . . Well, see and see, but do 
not perceive, hear and hear but do not understand, as the Lord says.  I can’t 
claim to understand that saying, as many times as I’ve heard it, and even 
preached on it.  It simply states a deeply mysterious fact.  You can know a thing 
to death and be for all purposes completely ignorant of it.  A man can know his 
father, or his son, and there might still be nothing between them but loyalty and 
love and mutual incomprehension.” (G: 7) 
Already perceptible here is Ames’s studied ambivalence of tone which, contrary to his 
reputation for faithful witness and honest dealing, allows him both to acknowledge the 
reality of inconvenient or intolerable truths while standing slightly apart from their field of 
implication.  Leaving aside whatever effect his remark that he will here make an 
“experiment” with candour might have upon our trust in the general reliability of his 
account, his self-cancelling phrases and pronominal vagueness keep us at a crucial and 
mystifying distance from the “truth” he would impart.  The impression given by these 
sentences that Ames is teetering upon the brink of a costly admission which he cannot yet 
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quite compel himself to make appears in the way they invite an ironic detachment from his 
father (to act in principle “as we say ourselves” may not necessarily be consistent with 
principled action) which is simultaneously avowed and annulled (how could he do 
otherwise than act with faithfulness to the truth “as he saw it”?  Is there another measure of 
responsible belief?).  As Ames proceeds his artful interplay of avowal and disavowal 
gradually hollows out everything it touches: what is the “something” in the way his father 
goes about “faithfulness to the truth that makes him disappointing “from time to time” and 
not just to Ames (but to how many others)?  By the time Ames concludes his reflection, the 
enigma of what he is trying to persuade us – the “deeply mysterious fact” that we can know 
a “thing” to death and yet still be completely ignorant of it – is matched only by the urgency 
of his need to say it, convinced as he apparently is that it reveals some vital and irreducible 
element of the nature of worldly experience. 
A clue that Ames’s radically equivocal style of writing arises in part from his desire to come 
out from behind his father’s saying and confront some undisclosed portion of his 
grandfather’s memory quickly follows.  Immediately after his brief experiment with 
candour Ames provides the first glimpse of his vexed family history by telling the story of 
the childhood trip he undertook alongside his father more than sixty years ago in 1892 to 
locate his grandfather’s grave in neighbouring Kansas.  After the old man’s abandoned 
grave is discovered the pair “worked a good while at putting things to rights”; it was during 
this time that Ames’s father recounted his own childhood memory of being awakened 
during the night by the sound of John Brown’s mule coming down the steps of his father’s 
Gilead church.  Entering the church to find the floor covered in the blood of one of Brown’s 
wounded comrades, he was hastily washing away the unmistakeable evidence of his father’s 
complicity in Brown’s incendiary anti-slavery insurgency when he was disturbed by the 
sudden arrival of a U.S. Army soldier hot in pursuit of “Osawatomie John Brown.”  This 
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solder was likely the same soldier his father later shot and winged while covering Brown’s 
retreat; the following Sunday the old man preached abolition from the pulpit wearing one of 
Brown’s men’s bloody shirts while his gun hung from his belt.  “I never dared to ask him 
what he’d been up to,” Ames’s father dismally concludes about these turbulent childhood 
years, “I couldn’t risk the possibility of hearing things that were worse than my suspicions.”  
Upon hearing this story, and stepping for the first time upon the ground of the bitter family 
schism, Ames is suddenly overwhelmed by “a pity that was far too deep to have any 
particular object.” (G: 110) 
Crucially for my purposes, this image of the grandfather engenders an excess of feeling 
which refuses to stay in its proper channels by opening up multiple and potentially 
antithetical points of attachment.  Such feeling goes beyond the father or the grandfather by 
occupying a space between them, but their dispute permits no common ground, and so Ames 
can only respond to one, and therefore to the other, by sacrificing one to the other in the 
necessary violence of the ethical decision.  Throughout his narrative, however, Ames’s 
troubled awareness of his violent sacrifice of some aspect of ethical responsibility in the 
name of ethical duty expresses itself in a kind of linguistic excess or double-focus which 
abruptly suspends the sacrificial process by placing him, if only for a moment, upon both 
sides of what it means to decide. 
A provoking example of the kinds of afterthought and misgivings generated in Ames’s 
narrative by his grandfather’s memory appears in his reflection upon the nature of baptism 
as blessing.  “There is a reality in blessing, which I take baptism to be, primarily,” Ames 
observes to his son, “It doesn’t enhance sacredness, but it acknowledges it, and there is a 
power in that.  I have felt it pass through me, so to speak.  The sensation is of really knowing 
a creature, I mean really feeling its mysterious life and your own mysterious life at the same 
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time” (G: 23).  Ames’s grandfather, meanwhile, transposes an intimation of sacred knowledge 
into a question of ethical responsibility: for him the reality in blessing he perceives in the 
wounds he received during active service on the Union side in the Civil War is inseparable 
from the obligation to identify with the persecuted other in its singular exposure to power: 
“He told me once that being blessed meant being bloodied, and that is true 
etymologically in English – but not in Greek or Hebrew.  So whatever 
understanding might be based on that derivation has no scriptural authority 
behind it.  It was unlike him to strain interpretation that way.  He did it in order 
to make an account of himself, I suppose, as most of us do” (G: 36) 
Ames’s defensiveness upon this point is revealing.  To grasp what might be at stake for 
Robinson in these remarks we need to bear in mind that while Ames’s grandfather may well 
be “straining interpretation” in understanding the reality in blessing in this way, in so doing 
he nevertheless anticipates Bonhoeffer’s crucial ethical distinction between “cheap” and 
“costly” grace.  Far from using Christianity as an escape from the evils of this world and the 
duties those evils imply, the old man’s revaluation of blessing as ethical commitment to 
principled action prefigures Bonhoffer’s uncompromising stress upon the responsible need 
to oppose “the passions of collective life that can at any time emerge to disgrace us.”26  What 
makes the comparison particularly telling is that it is at precisely this point in his narrative 
where he reconsiders blessing as the effect of principled, because ethically necessary, 
intervention in the realm of power’s dominion that Ames first confesses, in howsoever 
occulted a fashion, that it wasn’t mere loneliness which led the old man to abandon Gilead 
but the traumatic memory of antebellum racial violence incarnated by the burning of its 
black church: 
                                                          
26  , Marilynne Robinson,  The Death of Adam 113. 
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“Then he was terribly lonely, no doubt about it.  I think that was a big part of his 
running off to Kansas.  That and the fire at the Negro Church.  It wasn’t a big fire 
- someone heaped brush against the back wall and out a match to it, and 
someone else saw the smoke and the flames and out the flames out with a 
shovel. . . . I didn’t know the Negro pastor myself, but he said his father knew 
my grandfather.  He told me they were sorry to leave, because this town had 
once meant a good deal to them.” (G: 36-37) 
Despite, or indeed, because of Ames’s deeply equivocal response to this incident – it is only 
a “small” fire to those blind to the history of murderous prejudice concealed within it – his 
text now begins to splinter under the weight of another layer of historical consciousness 
which his own voice works continually to repress.27  Partly this fracturing reveals itself in 
the tone of vexatious self-recrimination – it is remarkable, notwithstanding critical testimony 
to Ames’s serene self-repose, just how angry he is and how continually he struggles to 
“control my temper” – which takes increasing possession of his narrative (G: 6”).  Elsewhere, 
however, it manifests itself in Ames’s obsessive troping of the image (and the memory) of 
fire itself which has the effect of splitting his narrative between two radically opposed, 
although absolutely inseparable, visions of what it might be to find a spiritual home in the 
world. 
Two consecutive scenes illustrate these rival dimensions of Ames’s text.  The first gives 
marvellous expression to his vision of the reality of spiritual life as a “kind of 
incandescence” at work in each of us, “the ‘I’ whose predicate can be ‘love’ or ‘fear’ or 
                                                          
27  My reading of the fire at the Black Church as an historical echo of the civic conflagration over the 
racial question known as “Bleeding Kansas” accordingly stands at a necessary distance from Lisa M. 
Siefker Bailey’s symbolic interpretation of fire in Gilead in spiritually renewing and redemptive terms 
as “a representation of the energy of being, which can become destructive like the Puritanical 
mistakes made in Ames’s grandfather’s church, or transcendent, like the filling of the Holy Spirit.” 
Lisa M. Siefker Bailey,. “Fraught with Fire: Race and Theology in Marilynne Robinson’s Gilead,” 
Christianity and Literature Volume 59: No 2 (Winter 2010), 265 
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‘want,’ and whose object can be ‘someone’ or ‘nothing’ and it won’t really matter, because 
the loveliness is just in that presence, shaped around ‘I’ like a flame on a wick, emanating 
itself in grief and guilt and joy and whatever else” (G: 44-45).  Continuing to try to convey 
the inner reality of an experience, he tells us, he has never before attempted to describe, 
Ames’s narrative then drifts irresistibly back to the memory of a childhood outing he took 
with his grandfather to a baseball game in Des Moines to watch the African-American 
player Bud Fowler, where an unexpected thunderstorm put a premature end to proceedings: 
“When he was young, he was an acquaintance of John Brown, and of Jim Lane, 
too. I wish I could tell you more about that.  There was a kind of truce in our 
household that discouraged talk about the old times in Kansas, and about the 
war.  It was not long after the trip to Des Moines that we lost him, or he lost 
himself.  In any case, a few weeks later he took off for Kansas. 
I read somewhere that a thing that does not exist in relation to something else 
cannot itself be said to exist.  I can’t quite see the meaning of a statement so 
purely hypothetical as this, although I may simply lack understanding.  But it 
does remind me of that afternoon when nothing flew through the air, no one slid 
or drifted or tagged, when there was no waltz at all, so to speak.  It seems to me 
that the storm had put an end to it, as if it were a fire to be put out, an eruption 
into this world of an alarming kind of nullity . . . . Null.  That word has real 
power.  My grandfather had nowhere to spend his courage, no way to feel it 
himself.  That was a great pity.” (G: 47) 
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Revealed here in the paradoxical structure of knowing as unknowing and unknowing as 
knowing is the underlying structure of Ames’s entire narrative.28  In revisiting the memory 
of the baseball game Ames’s thoughts unexpectedly turn to a statement he once read that the 
meaning of a thing exists not simply in its particularity or singularity but always also in its 
relation to some other thing or things in general.  Implicit in this statement is a premonitory 
glimpse of the originary paradox between absolute (the thing in itself) and general 
responsibility (the thing in its inseparable relation to an outside which constitutes ethics as 
such) concealed at the core of his grandfather’s parable about the nature of the ethical 
encounter.  Revealingly, Ames’s first response is to refuse to acknowledge the reality of this 
general horizon of sense (“a statement so purely hypothetical”), but as recollection 
recomposes itself in his mind the persisting presence of this irreducible generality becomes 
inseparable from the scene of memory itself which exists “as if it were a fire to be put out, an 
eruption into this world of an alarming kind of nullity,” a visionary intuition which binds 
the outrage of the church fire to the “nullity” of any response which fails to recognise within 
it the trace of a collective historical trauma.  Momentarily shocked into recognition by the 
self-implicating force of this unwelcome revelation, Ames can only preserve his equanimity 
by projecting this perception of failed response out onto his grandfather, sacrificing in the 
process an essential part of his responsibility to the past.  His nascent, although necessarily 
occulted, awareness of the ethical cost of his own work of repression nevertheless becomes 
apparent in his very next sentence (“As I write I am aware that my memory has made much 
of very little”) where too little has also been made of so much that still remains to be 
confronted. 
                                                          
28  For an insightful discussion of Robinson’s use of baseball as a “cultural metonym” for both broader 
patterns of racial segregation and Ames’s own “amnesia” concerning this troubled racial history see 
Susan Petit, “Field of Deferred Dreams: Baseball and Historical Amnesia in Marilynne Robinson’s 
Gilead and Home,” MELUS: Multi Ethnic Literature of the US Volume 37 No 4 (Winter 2012) 119-37. 
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The complex work of repression at work here becomes even more explicit in Ames’s first 
direct account of his father’s attitude to his own father’s radical abolitionist commitments: 
“My father was born in Kansas, as I was, because the old man had come there 
from Maine just to help Free Soilers establish the right to vote, because the 
constitution was going to be voted on that would decide whether Kansas entered 
the Union slave or free.  Quite a few people went out there at the time for that 
reason.  And, of course, so did people from Missouri who wanted Kansas for the 
South.  So things were badly out of hand for a while.  All best forgotten, my 
father used to say.  He didn’t like mention of those times, and that did cause 
some hard feelings between him and his father.  I’ve read up on those events 
considerably, and I’ve decided my father was right.  And that’s just as well, because 
people have forgotten.”  (italics mine; G: 75-76) 
Such is the force of repression at work here that it hovers upon the brink of a double 
negation: my father wanted people to forget the past, and that is just as well, because people 
have forgotten.  A similarly compulsive pressure exerts itself in the extraordinary 
accompanying scene where Ames’s father, upon discovering a gun owned by the boy’s 
grandfather, first buries it, then returns some hours later to dig it up and rebury it, before 
returning a month later to dig it up a second time and throw it into the river.  Watching his 
father Ames cannot but become aware that he is witness to a violent compulsion; as his 
father finally disposes of the gun’s shattered remains Ames “got the impression he wished 
they didn’t exist at all, that he wouldn’t have really been content to drop them in the ocean, 
that he’d have set about to retrieve them again from any depth at all if he’d thought of a way to make 
them vanish entirely” (G: 79; italics mine).  Ames’s father’s purpose in attempting this violent 
destruction of historical residues is to “disremember” the past in Geoffrey Hill’s sense of the 
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term: disremembering not, that is, as mere “forgetting” or “failing to remember” but as 
“dismembering the memory.”29  Crucially, however, this destructive assault upon the past 
fails to achieve its objective because the action of violent repression generates a 
psychological excess or supplement which manifests itself in the paradoxical desire 
continually to recover and re-present the object of fearful memory in order that it may be 
repudiated with ever increasing force in a ceaseless dialectic of revelation and disavowal. 
Precisely this desire is reproduced in the complex interplay between knowing and 
unknowing which animates Ames’s reflection upon his father’s exorbitant actions: 
“So I was predisposed to believe that my grandfather had done something pretty 
terrible and my father was concealing the evidence and I was in on the secret, 
too – implicated without knowing what I was implicated in . . . . I believe I was 
implicated, and am, and would have been if I had never seen that pistol.  It has 
been my experience that guilt can burst through the smallest breach and cover 
the landscape, and abide in it in pools and danknesses, just as native as water.  I 
believe my father was trying to cover up for Cain, more or less.  The things that 
happened in Kansas lay behind it all, as I knew at the time” (G: 81-82) 
To invoke the original fratricidal story against the background of the Kansas War over 
slavery is, however, necessarily to beg the question: Who stands in for Cain in bearing 
responsibility for the murder of his brothers?  Where Ames’s guilty foreboding upon this 
point abides here in the ambivalence of his phrasing – what does it mean to say that his 
father “covered up” for Cain more or less? – it later bursts through to cover the entire 
landscape of his narrative as he watches his father preaching in the immediate aftermath of 
his grandfather’s final departure for Kansas: 
                                                          
29   Geoffrey Hill,.  Style and Faith (New York: Counterpoint, 2003) 3. 
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“But I would watch my father preaching about Abel’s blood crying out from the 
ground, and I’d wonder how he could speak about that the way he did.  I had so 
much respect for my father.  I felt certain that he should hide the guilt of his 
father, and that I should also hide the guilt of mine.”  (G: 85; italics mine) 
In the second half of Gilead Robinson begins to expose Ames’s troubled identification with 
his father’s teaching to a different kind of truth by crossing the story of Cain and Abel with 
the parable of the Prodigal Son.  Pondering his friend Boughton’s melancholy quotation 
“Man is born to trouble as the sparks fly upward,” Ames reflects “An old fire will make a 
dark husk for itself and settle in on its core, as in the case of this planet.  I believe the same 
metaphor may describe the human individual as well.  Perhaps Gilead.  Perhaps civilization.  
Prod a little and the sparks will fly” (G: 72).  He is compelled to confront some of the 
implications of this same metaphor in the very next paragraph when he hears the news of 
the return to Gilead of his godson and namesake John Ames (Jack) Boughton.  Jack 
Boughton left Gilead in disgrace decades ago having fathered, then abandoned, a daughter 
who later died in impoverished neglect, a tragedy which harrowed his father’s conscience 
and further grieved Ames by reminding him of the death in childbirth of his own child 
Angeline many years before.  The magnitude of Boughton’s offence appears even more 
appalling to Ames in light of his belief that in dishonouring a child we deny some portion of 
the living will of God at work in each of us.  “[N]ow that I am about to leave this world, I 
realize that there is nothing more astonishing than a human face,” Ames observes at one 
point, thinking back to the few precious hours he cherished Angeline, “It has something to 
do with incarnation.  You feel your obligation to a child when you have seen it and held it.  
Any human face is a claim on you, because you can’t help but feel the singularity of it, the 
courage and loneliness of it.” (G: 66)  In failing in his response to his child, Boughton 
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therefore always also fails in his more general ethical responsibility to what binds us to our 
own and to our fellows in the form of our common humanity. 
Perhaps the most remarkable, and for Ames disquieting, aspect of his renewed relationship 
with Boughton is the way he gradually becomes implicated by the terms of his own 
judgement.  From their earliest acquaintance Ames had always been aware of an “element of 
parody” in Boughton’s unconscious assumption of his own preacherly manner; what he 
once dismissed as mere parody now reappears as a demand to rethink his own Christian 
ethics in the face of his responsibility to the singular child (G: 120).  Driven out of Tennessee 
by the combined force of segregationist intolerance and anti-miscegenation laws following 
his marriage to an African-American woman and his fathering of a mixed-race son, 
Boughton’s despairing return to Gilead presents a traumatic racialized reminder of how 
much in what should bind us in our absolute responsibility to the other as other is still left 
out of account in modern American life in the century since Ames’s grandfather fought in 
Kansas. 
The challenge Boughton presents to Ames’s Christian ethics abides in the implicit question 
which hangs over the novel: why can’t he simply move his family home to live securely and 
at peace in Gilead?  The answer when it comes – that the shock of Boughton’s interracial 
marriage might kill his Minister father in his physical debility – becomes doubly 
disconcerting by folding Ames himself back into its field of implication: 
“He drew a long breath.  He said, ‘You know my father so well.’ 
But I can’t give any assurances about this, one way or the other.  I’d hate to be 
wrong.  You’ll have to let me reflect on it. 
Then he said, ‘If it were you and not my father – ‘ 
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Now I could see his point in putting that question, since Boughton and I are in 
general very much of one mind.  But it was not so simple a question as he might have 
thought, and I paused over it” (G: 229-230; italics mine) 
The centrality of the racial question to the vexed relationship between the sacred and the 
secular at the core of Gilead Congregationalism is further underscored in Home, Robinson’s 
first sequel to Gilead, where the dying Reverend Boughton is visibly perturbed by televised 
images of protestors marching for Civil Rights.  In tracing out the occlusion in Ames and his 
father’s angle of vision which prevents him from reconciling himself to their sense of the 
truth of the Christian religion, Boughton returns insistently to the figure of Ames’s 
grandfather: 
“He just sat there for a while, and then he said,’ A friend of mine, no, not a 
friend, a man I met in Tennessee – had heard about this town, and he had also 
heard of your grandfather.  He told me some stories about the old days in 
Kansas that his father had told him.  He said that during the Civil War Iowa had 
a colored regiment. ‘ 
‘Yes, we did.  And a greybeard regiment and a Methodist regiment, as they 
called it.  They were teetotallers, at any rate.’ 
 ‘I was interested to learn that there was a colored regiment,’ he said.  I wouldn’t 
have thought there were many colored people in this state.’ 
‘Oh, yes. Quite a few colored people came up from Missouri in the days before 
the war.  And I think quite a few came up from the Mississippi Valley, too.’ 
He said, ‘When I was growing up, there were some Negro families in this town.’ 
I said, ‘Yes, there were, but they left some years ago.’ 
‘I remember hearing about a fire at their church.’ 
‘Oh yes, but that was many years ago, when I was a boy.  And it was only a small 
fire. There was very little damage.’” (G: 171) 
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Working on Ames’s mind like the return of the repressed, the effect of this exchange with 
Boughton is to dislocate him from the sense of his own sentences by suspending him 
between two different versions of what it means to respond.  Following their conversation 
he finds himself afflicted once more with “that old weight in the chest, telling me there is 
something I must dwell on, because I know more than I know and must learn it from 
myself.” (G: 179)  Chief among these things is his abiding sense of his failure to respond to 
the demands of responsibility itself, which arises from “a tendency, in my thinking, for the 
opposed sides of a question to cancel each other more or less algebraically – this is true, but 
on the other hand, so is that, so I discover a kind of equivalency of considerations that is 
interesting in itself but resolves nothing” (G: 140).  Insofar as the intractability of the demand 
Boughton embodies compels Ames’s reluctant recognition of the possibility that it may 
sometimes be necessary to transgress ethical duty in order to fulfil it, it also confirms the 
justice of his suspicion that “often enough, when we think we are protecting ourselves, we 
are struggling against our rescuer.” (G: 154)  That the route to such rescue must pass 
through a proper reckoning with the unclaimed portion of his grandfather’s inheritance 
becomes clear in the extraordinary passage which relocates the scene of Ames’s present 
bewilderment to the contested landscape of the Kansas War: 
“I have wandered to the limits of my understanding any number of times, out 
into that desolation, that Horeb, that Kansas, and I’ve scared myself too, a good 
many times, leaving all landmarks behind me, or so it seemed.  And it has been 
among the true pleasures of my life.  Night and light, silence and difficulty, it 
seemed to me always rigorous and good.  I believe it was recommended to me 
by Edward, and also by my reverend grandfather when he made his last flight 
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into the wilderness.  I may once have fancied myself such another tough old 
man, ready to dive into the ground and smoulder away until Judgement.  Well, I 
am distracted from that project now.  My present bewilderments are a new 
territory that make me doubt I have ever really been lost before.” (G: 191) 
And yet it may perhaps be the case, as Shakespeare’s late romances remind us, that first we 
must be lost in order to be found.  The implications for Gilead of this visionary statement 
may be glimpsed in the fact that it is only by means of his desolating dislocation into the 
“new territory” of uncertain belief that Ames is able to begin the complex work of 
redemption through which he brings some measure of absolution to Boughton by taking his 
guilt and distress upon himself.  Yet what is too often overlooked by critical accounts of the 
novel – but which glimmers fitfully in the overdetermined phrase “new territory” that folds 
Ames’s text back upon the divided ground of Bleeding Kansas – is that this restitutive 
movement requires that he first confront the historical trauma encoded in his perception of 
Boughton as “a man standing too close to a fire.” (G: 191).  Ultimately it is only by 
relinquishing his (ir)responsible fidelity to one version of his family narrative and 
suspending himself between the law of the father and grandfather that Ames can come into 
possession of the story he fears and needs to tell which conserves within its longing for the 
“ecstatic fire” of grace the memory of a burning church and the ex-static structure of the 
truly responsible decision (G: 197).Ω30 
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